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Should Singapore Adopt 'Say On Pay'? 
SoP may require disclosures that could harm a firm's competitive interests. 
By: The Business Times, Clarence Goh | 14 Oct 2014 
 
IN the corporate setting, the remuneration of chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
senior executives is typically determined by the board of directors. In many 
countries, corporate governance codes have been developed to provide guidance on 
such remuneration practices. However, there has been a recent trend of countries 
adopting regulations which allow shareholders some form of voting rights on 
executive remuneration. Such voting rights are commonly referred to as Say on Pay 
(SoP) votes. 
While certain aspects of individual SoP regulations may differ - for example, votes 
can be binding or non-binding - they are generally instituted with the aim of 
incentivising boards to act in the interests of shareholders and to avoid awarding 
executives excessive pay packages. 
SoP first appeared in the UK in 2002, when the Directors' Remuneration Report 
Regulations required all UK companies listed on major exchanges to hold non-
binding SoP votes on executive compensation annually. In 2013, regulations were 
updated to give shareholders a binding vote. 
In the United States, SoP was introduced as part of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program in 2009 when companies with outstanding financial assistance loans were 
required to hold SoP votes. With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2011, all 
public companies are now also required to hold non-binding SoP votes. 
Evidently, SoP is becoming increasingly commonplace. According to a 2013 report 
by the Hay Group, 12 of 16 major jurisdictions studied - including the US, UK and 
Australia - had some form of SoP legislation in place. 
In Singapore, there have been calls to introduce SoP. During the Singapore 
Corporate Awards Seminar in May 2014, Lee Suet Fern, managing partner of 
Stamford Law Corporation, called for Singapore to consider adopting SoP. She 
noted that Singapore would have to decide whether to take up SoP practices that are 
being adopted internationally, or "be Robinson Crusoe and ride far out there and be 
different from everybody else". 
  
SMU Classification: Restricted 
She further added that SoP will ensure that management is directly accountable to 
shareholders, and could also help companies reduce their reliance on a "hero CEO". 
However, others have cautioned against the idea. At the same event, Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) chairman Chew Choon Seng suggested that SoP "may have the 
perverse effect that shareholders, for whatever reason, refuse to compensate 
executives fairly, damaging the prospects of the company and deterring much-
needed talent from joining the company, particularly one that is troubled". 
Diverse views 
Gerard Ee, president of the Institute of Singapore Chartered Accountants, also 
observed that many companies here are comparatively small, and would "find it a 
great burden to follow compliance rules". 
Given these diverse views on implementing SoP in Singapore, it might be useful to 
highlight some considerations for and against its adoption. 
SoP represents a direct way of enhancing board and management accountability to 
shareholders. Without SoP, shareholders can voice their disapproval of executive 
remuneration only by voting against the re-election of board members involved in the 
setting of executive pay. Such votes are non-specific and do not clearly signal 
shareholder unhappiness about excessive executive pay. 
In contrast, SoP votes establish a mechanism for shareholders to directly express 
their displeasure over executive remuneration matters. 
Consequently, SoP can potentially be effective in preventing inappropriate executive 
pay. In Canada, where the introduction of mandatory SoP is being debated, 
proponents say that it can increase the accountability, transparency and 
performance linkage of executive pay in the country. 
Consistent with this, a 2012 report by Sodali, which surveyed 35 institutional 
investors from 10 countries, showed that four out of five institutional investors 
support the SoP voting process. The report also noted that "the survey results and 
comments from respondents make clear investors view the say-on-pay vote as a 
highly successful corporate governance tool that provides insight into board 
independence and a means to promote dialogue on both governance and strategic 
issues". 
Further, concerns that shareholders could potentially use SoP votes to wilfully reject 
executive pay packages may be unfounded. Analysis of SoP voting trends in the US 
by Semler Brossy reveal that in the first half of 2013, 1,759 out of 1,800 firms 
obtained shareholder support in their SoP votes, with 72 per cent of companies 
receiving at least 90 per cent shareholder approval. 
Overall, only the most flagrant pay practices tend to be voted down by shareholders. 
These negative examples which are rejected by shareholders often also play a 
useful role in subsequently serving as benchmarks for firms keen to avoid 
controversial pay practices. 
In these respects, SoP could play a meaningful part in reducing inappropriate 
executive compensation. 
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However, another school of thought is that shareholders may not be able to make 
better or more informed decisions than the boards of directors when voting on 
executive remuneration. 
A 2009 article from the University of California, Los Angeles opines that 
"shareholders have neither the information nor the incentives necessary to make 
sound decisions on either operational or policy questions". 
Given the length and complexity of disclosure documents, and that most 
shareholders' holdings are likely to be too small to significantly influence SoP voting 
outcomes, it is probable that the average shareholder could decide that "the 
necessary investment of time and effort in making informed voting decisions simply 
is not worthwhile". 
Correspondingly, leaving decisions on executive pay in the hands of shareholders 
may not lead to optimal outcomes for the firm. 
Additionally, SoP regulation can impose a significant compliance and administrative 
burden on firms. A Tower Watson survey of US firms in 2011 found that, for 40 per 
cent of respondents, the "desire to minimise administrative burden" influenced how 
often they intended to hold SoP votes. 
The survey further noted that in addition to resources allocated to holding SoP votes, 
companies also had to devote significant resources to other associated activities 
such as: 
 Analysis and communication of voting results 
 Development of outreach programmes to address shareholder concerns and 
to lay groundwork for future votes 
 Development of new compensation packages (if required) 
In Singapore, the Code of Corporate Governance currently requires firms to only 
disclose the various components of a CEO's remuneration to the nearest thousand 
dollars, and those of the top five key management personnel in bands of S$250,000. 
SoP may require excessive disclosures that inadvertently harm a firm's competitive 
interests. 
Caution should be exercised in deciding whether or not to move ahead with SoP in 
Singapore. In this regard, a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the relevant issues 
would provide a useful context for furthering the discussion on SoP here. 
In gauging the potential benefits that SoP could bring, the extent and severity of the 
existing executive pay problem in Singapore should be assessed to determine the 
degree to which shareholders stand to gain from any new regulation. 
Any Singapore-specific factors which could limit the knowledge or incentives of 
investors to cast informed votes should also be identified because they may reduce 
any potential benefits to be gained from mandating SoP votes. 
For instance, given that the majority of SGX-listed firms are family-owned - a joint 
2011 study by the National University of Singapore's Centre for Governance, 
Institution, and Organisation and Family Business Network Asia found that 52 per 
cent of SGX-listed firms are family-owned - the ability of and hence motivation for 
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minority shareholders to influence remuneration policy through SoP votes might be 
relatively low. 
Additionally, the overall benefits of SoP should be measured against the significant 
costs associated with additional compliance, administration and disclosure that local 
firms would have to shoulder should SoP become mandatory. 
Given the comparatively small sizes of Singapore firms, administrative loads are 
likely to represent a significant burden. 
The introduction of SoP requirements will also certainly require more extensive 
disclosures of executive remuneration than is currently required, and could 
compromise any competitive strength which firms may hold in this area. 
 
